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Law and Disorder: The High Court’s Hasty 
Decision in Miranda Leaves a Tangled Mess 
Jeremy M. Miller* 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an essay borne of almost three decades of studying 
the infamous 1966 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Miranda v. Ari-
zona.1  This is, paradoxically, both the easiest and most difficult 
task.  It is easy because, although Miranda was a 100-plus page 
opinion, there have been at least 1000 articles tailored to most 
every sentence in that opinion.  Fairly it can be queried, “What 
does this professor have to add?” 
Miranda was judicial fiat: at its worst, it was ultra vires, it 
was a usurpation of the legislative function, it was illogical, it 
was—being complimentary—the second try at handling a social 
problem.  It was verbose, it confused the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel2 with the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause,3 
it was filled with dicta that was inexorably eroded from its birth 
to the present.  It changed the long-held belief that the self-
incrimination right attached at trial or trial-like proceedings, not 
in the street.  But, at its best, it was idealistic, it attempted to 
maximize the truth-finding function of trial, it maximized indi-
vidual dignity and liberty, and it gave law professors a meaning-
ful chance to pontificate and earn tenure.  Additionally, it relied 
on the intrinsic equitable powers of the High Court to fashion 
appropriate remedies. 
Admittedly, the Anglo-American process of common law de-
 
 * Professor of Law, Chapman University; LL.M. University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 
Tulane; B.A. Yale.  The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Kara 
Germane, a graduating Chapman law student.  
 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
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velopment includes the notion that in a judge’s role of interpret-
ing the law, he or she, by necessity, creates law.  Law is not 
automatically self-effectuating.  Yet it is expected that a judge 
will attempt to follow the original intent of the framers of that 
law; this is so-called “originalism.”4  However, not only do evolv-
ing notions of decency5 mandate judicial balancing and change, 
but radical population changes, technological advances, and so-
cial evolution indicate that strict construction of “originalism” is 
unworkable—except as a first principle.  As a first principle, it 
checks unbridled judicial caprice.  As the only principle, it 
“freezes” law into a cruel irrelevance. 
The High Court should (and still could) correct this self-
inflicted wound.  It is indisputable that all American courts, in-
cluding the U.S. Supreme Court, have the power to fashion equi-
table remedies.  But equitable remedies, essentially amounting to 
unbridled judicial discretion, are a dangerous last resort. 
The Framers were not plagued by crime, nor did they have a 
massive police force.  They were aware that uncorroborated con-
fessions were unreliable, and thus the corpus delicti rule6 was, 
and still is, part of our common law.  The rule precludes convict-
ing an individual based solely on his or her own uncorroborated 
confession.7 
The High Court should have, and did, mandate that the self-
incrimination clause should apply prior to trial, at the time of ar-
rest.  Prior to Miranda, pre-trial confessions or admissions had to 
be “voluntary.”8  Otherwise, under traditional evidence law, the 
prejudicial effect would outweigh the probative value.  Addition-
ally, involuntariness was interpreted to violate the due process 
requirements of both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amend-
ments.9  Accordingly, to effectuate this mandate the Court should 
 
 4 Originalism is defined as “[t]he theory that the U.S. Constitution should be inter-
preted according to the intent of those who drafted and adopted it.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1126 (7th ed. 1999).  
 5 Decency is defined as “[t]he state of being proper, as in speech or dress; the quality 
of being seemly.” Id. at 413. 
 6 The corpus delicti rule is “[t]he doctrine that prohibits a prosecutor from proving 
the corpus delicti based solely on a defendant’s extrajudicial statements.” Id. at 346. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969).  
  After considering the full record, we do not disturb the determination of 
the trial court, affirmed by the New York appellate courts, that Morales’ con-
fessions were voluntarily given.  The trial occurred prior to Miranda v. Ari-
zona, and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confessions shows 
that the confessions were voluntary, not coerced. 
Id. at 104 (citation omitted). 
 9 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693–94 (1993) (holding that in con-
sidering a criminal defendant’s claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and whether the defendant’s conviction improperly rested on an involuntary 
713-728 MILLER.DOC 9/25/2007 8:15:54 AM 
2007] Law and Disorder 715 
have, and did, require that the arrestee be affirmatively told of 
this due process right.10 
Then the High Court began an embarrassing set of stumbles.  
Correctly, it held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel ap-
plied after formal charging in Massiah.11  But it stumbled badly 
in Escobedo in holding that the “target” of a criminal investiga-
tion must be told of his or her right to counsel whether or not 
that person is arrested or formally charged.12  Although Escobedo 
has never been overruled, it has been limited to its facts.13 
Instead of holding that the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel attaches when the suspect is placed in jail or even arrested, 
which using their parlance, is certainly a “critical stage”14 in a 
potential defendant’s criminal—or not—future, the Court created 
a non-existent aspect of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination 
Clause.  That is, when an individual is under arrest, he or she 
must affirmatively be told not only of his or her right to remain 
silent, but also of the right to counsel.15  The rule proved as im-
 
confession, courts must look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether a con-
fession was voluntary, including (1) the crucial element of police coercion; (2) the length, 
location, and continuity of the interrogation; (3) the defendant’s maturity, education, 
physical condition, and mental health; and (4) the failure of the police to advise the defen-
dant of his or her rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during custodial in-
terrogation). 
 10 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[T]he privilege [against self-
incrimination] is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’” (quoting Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964))).  
 11 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964). 
 12 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485–86 (1964).  
[A] Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at . . . trial 
could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by 
the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding.  Anything less . . . might 
deny a defendant effective representation by counsel at the only stage when le-
gal aid and advice would help him.  
Id. at 484–85 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 13 See United States v. Muzychka, 725 F.2d 1061, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 14 See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (recognizing a long-standing 
rule that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches not only at trial, but also at ear-
lier, “critical” stages). 
 15 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–469. 
[I]n apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a con-
tinuous opportunity to exercise it,  the following safeguards must be observed.   
  At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he 
must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to 
remain silent. 
  . . . . 
  The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the ex-
planation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in 
court. 
Id. 
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practicable as it was ridiculous, and has been riddled with excep-
tions.16   
The rule should have been that the arrestee be told of his or 
her right to silence, and that upon jailing, the arrestee be offered 
counsel, thus moving the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to 
the pre-trial arena.  For the purists, an alternate logical rule 
would have been a strong presumption of voluntariness if the 
“rights” were given verbally, and a presumption of involuntari-
ness if they were not given verbally. 
Instead, we have volumes of “jigsaw puzzle” law and an en-
cyclopedia of exceptions to Miranda.  We also have the High 
Court’s grudging acceptance of a rule that it admits is not truly 
constitutional.  It did this recently in Dickerson, which tackled 
the issue of Miranda as a constitutional principle and decided 
whether the U.S. Congress could “overrule” it.17 
A brief examination of the historical background of the Fifth 
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause will be helpful for inter-
pretation.  Even in colonial times an inquisitorial, torture-laden, 
 
[T]he need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends 
not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have 
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires. 
  . . . . 
  An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer.  
While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to 
ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver.  No effective waiver of the right 
to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after 
the warnings we here delineate have been given. 
Id. at 470. 
 16 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–58 (1984) (establishing a “public 
safety” exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before questioning: 
for example, if the defendant is in possession of information regarding the location of an 
unattended gun in a supermarket, or there are other similar exigent circumstances which 
require protection of the public, the defendant may be questioned without warning and 
his responses, though incriminating, will be admissible in evidence); Rhode Island v. In-
nis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–03 (1980) (holding that a spontaneous statement made by a defen-
dant while in custody, even though the defendant has not been given Miranda warnings 
or invoked the right to counsel, is admissible in evidence as long as the statement was not 
given in response to police questioning or other conduct by the police likely to produce an 
incriminating response);  Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (holding that a 
confession obtained in violation of the Miranda standards may nonetheless be used for 
purposes of impeaching the defendant’s testimony: that is, if the defendant takes the 
stand at trial and the prosecution wishes to introduce his or her confession as a prior in-
consistent statement to attack his or her credibility, the Miranda holding will not prohibit 
this); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165–67 (1986) (holding that Miranda’s require-
ment for “voluntariness” means only that the suspect reasonably appears to understand 
what he or she is doing, and is not being coerced into signing the waiver, regardless of 
whether the suspect may actually have been insane at the time). 
 17 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (“We hold that Miranda, 
being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of 
Congress.”). 
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trial-by-ordeal method was not uncommon.18  Likewise there was 
hostility to the “ex officio” oath.  The ex officio oath was a badge 
of infamy on an often exemplary common law.  It required that 
the defendant place his or her hand on a Bible and promise to 
truthfully answer questions asked of him or her.  After this point, 
incriminating answers were sought and were punishable.19  Fur-
ther, there was no right to refuse to answer.20  Perjury, at least in 
capital cases, was punishable by death.21  Sir Edward Coke, the 
famous Elizabethan English lawyer and judge, placed his career 
on the line to have the ex officio oath ousted from the common 
law.  Coke’s persistence cost him his job, as King James removed 
Coke from office in 1616.22  The Lilburne trial and tragedy, also 
in the 1600s in England, did much to cement the right against 
self-incrimination into the common law.23  There, the rebel writer 
Lilburne was publicly tortured and tried.  He dramatically em-
phasized the injustice of the ex officio oath, and his eloquence 
and popular support did much to bring the safeguards now em-
bodied in the Self-Incrimination Clause into the English sys-
tem.24 
Another source of the privilege against self-incrimination 
was the 1689 Scottish Claim of Rights.25  It should be noted, 
however, that the right was not in the Magna Carta.26  The right 
crossed the Atlantic when James Madison, the principal author 
of the Fifth Amendment, purposefully used broad drafting so as 
to make the right itself broad.27 
Finally, in Malloy v. Hogan in 1964, the privilege against 
self-incrimination was made applicable to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.28 
 
 18 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 346–47 (Ivan R. Dee 1999) (1968). 
 19 Id. at 46–47, 274. 
 20 Id. at 132–34. 
 21 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 335 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 22 See Leonard W. Levy, The Origins of the Fifth Amendment and its Critics, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 821, 823 (1997); see also LEVY, supra note 18, at 254. 
 23 See Sara A. Leahy, Note, United States v. Balsys: Foreign Prosecution and the Ap-
plicability of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 987, 991 n.29 (1999).  See also LEVY, supra note 18, at 282. 
 24 LEVY, supra note 18, at 271–82. 
 25 See R. Carter Pittman, Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 764 (1935) (“The only constitu-
tional document that recognized [the privilege against self-incrimination] in any form be-
fore 1776 is the Scotch Claim of Rights of 1689 . . . .”).  
 26 Id. 
 27 Cf. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 712–13 (1985). 
 28 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
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MIRANDA AND POLICE INTERROGATION PRIOR TO  
FORMAL CHARGING 
A. The Voluntariness Standard 
Prior to the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona regard-
ing pre-indictment interrogation and confession, the due process 
requirement of general “voluntariness” controlled.29  The test for 
voluntariness is whether the suspect’s will was overborne.30  For 
example, in 1936 in Brown v. Mississippi,31 a confession that re-
sulted from obvious torture was overturned. 
Similarly, the Court has held that psychological coercion is 
sufficient to void the admissibility of certain confessions.  In 
Leyra v. Denno, the bringing in of a psychiatrist, purportedly to 
help the defendant with a sinus problem but in fact to gain a con-
fession, was held to violate constitutional requirements for due 
process.32  Lengthy interrogations and interrogations of the 
“weak” indicate involuntariness under the Due Process Clause. 
Although the due process voluntariness standard has been 
overshadowed by Miranda, it is still relevant if Miranda is inap-
plicable, such as when the suspect is not in custody or is not for-
mally charged.  That is, all statements in order to be used 
against the accused must be voluntary, under the totality of the 
circumstances.33 
B.  Miranda—Custodial Interrogation 
In the 1960s, the Warren Court realized the potential detri-
mental effect that a confession or other incriminating statement 
could have on the accused’s case.  The introduction of a confes-
sion usually signals guilt to the jury.  Moreover, the High Court 
was not pleased with the state courts’ guarding of defendants’ 
rights.  It therefore strengthened the self-incrimination protec-
tion.  In early attempts to strengthen the accused’s position when 
faced with police interrogation, the Court applied the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  The 1964 cases of Massiah34 and 
Escobedo35 explain this principle.  However, and perhaps illogi-
cally, the Court later attacked the problem by applying the Fifth 
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause—provided there was cus-
tody (meaning arrest). 
 
 29 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464, 467 (1966). 
 30 Watts v. Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, 53 (1949). 
 31 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281–82, 285–87 (1936). 
 32 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559–60 (1954). 
 33 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).   
 34 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964). 
 35 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 484–85 (1964). 
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Miranda v. Arizona36 was a set of four cases considered to-
gether.  It metamorphosed the prior law.  Instead of a case-by-
case approach, examining voluntariness under the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court, in effect, created a new confession 
code.  That is, prior to interrogation, suspects in custody must be 
warned that they have the right to remain silent, that anything 
they say can be used against them in court, that they have a 
right to counsel (not based on the Sixth Amendment), and that if 
they cannot afford counsel one will be appointed for them.37  Fur-
thermore, even if the suspect waives his or her rights after being 
given these warnings, the prosecution must show that the waiver 
was knowingly and intelligently given.38 
Later Supreme Court opinions have limited Miranda.39  The 
following discussion is a systematic approach to analyzing a 
Miranda problem, and proof that the opinion has been so se-
verely eroded as to warrant overruling or modification. 
1. Was There Custody? 
For Miranda to attach, there must be custody.  One is in cus-
tody when, by a show of police authority, he or she is actually re-
strained or submits to this show of authority.40  An interview 
with government agents, standing by itself, does not require giv-
ing Miranda warnings, and thus suppression of subsequent ad-
missions is not proper.  Moreover, an interview at the police sta-
tion is not per se custodial.41  
 
 36 384 U.S. 436, 456–57 (1966). 
 37 Id. at 444. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (holding that pre-
custodial traffic stops do not require giving Miranda warnings prior to questioning); 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (holding that Miranda warnings were pro-
cedural safeguards of the right against compelled self-incrimination and not themselves 
protected by the Constitution); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (holding 
that Miranda warnings are prophylactic measures providing “practical reinforcement” for 
the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and not themselves 
rights protected by the Constitution). 
 40 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initi-
ated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”). 
 41 Id. at 478.  
  In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not pur-
port to find all confessions inadmissible.  Confessions remain a proper element 
in law enforcement.  Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any 
compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.  The fundamental 
import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is al-
lowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but 
whether he can be interrogated.  There is no requirement that police stop a 
person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a 
crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other state-
ment he desires to make.  Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred 
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The case law is clear: Either an arrest or a de facto arrest is 
custodial, thus requiring that Miranda warnings be given prior 
to interrogation.42  A related question is whether a mere “Terry 
stop” also requires that a suspect be given Miranda warnings 
prior to questioning.  In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Supreme 
Court ruled that stops, although they are Fourth Amendment 
“seizures,” do not require the giving of Miranda warnings prior to 
questioning because a stop is both briefer in duration than an ar-
rest and a lesser restraint on freedom.43  It therefore held that 
custody is to be judged on the objective indicia of arrest—the offi-
cer’s belief or intent is irrelevant.44  It should be noted in passing 
that custody for habeas corpus can be satisfied more easily.  The 
author is troubled by this reasoning.  If an arrest mandates 
Miranda warnings, a stop, which is almost as intimidating, 
should also. 
2. Was There Interrogation? 
Miranda warnings are not required unless there is interro-
gation (as well as custody).  It therefore becomes of great impor-
tance to understand what interrogation is.  Rhode Island v. Innis 
defined interrogation under Miranda as either express question-
ing or behavior that the police should know is “reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response.”45  The first part of the defini-
tion is obvious: Interrogation occurs when there is express ques-
tioning.  The second part covers the less obvious situation where, 
for instance, the police use trickery to gain a response.  Under 
the Innis test, responses gained via police trickery are insulated 
from suppression provided that the suspect did not give the objec-
tive appearance of being weak.46  It must be emphasized that this 
is a solely objective test.  Police bad faith is irrelevant.47  Thus 
“playing on” guilt is acceptable—provided that there are not ob-
jective indicia of psychological weakness on the part of the sus-
pect.  Only when the suspect is young, emotionally frazzled (e.g., 
in tears) or physically impaired will police trickery amount to in-
 
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding 
today. 
Id.  With this holding, incidentally, the Court fully abandoned the old Escobedo 
“target of investigation” test for requiring warnings. 
 42 Id. at 467–68. 
 43 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. 
 44 Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994). 
 45 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980); id. at 298 (“By custodial interro-
gation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444) (emphasis omitted)).  
 46 Id. at 302 n.8. 
 47 Id. at 301. 
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terrogation.48 
Innis was arrested on charges of murder and robbery.49  He 
invoked his Miranda rights.  For that reason, police were pre-
cluded from interrogating him.  On the way to the police station, 
after his arrest, two officers conversed to each other regarding the 
missing rifle and the danger the rifle posed to the disabled chil-
dren at the nearby school.50  Innis volunteered to lead them to 
the gun, and the gun was discovered just where Innis indicated.  
Leading the officers to the gun was incriminating and at least 
partially testimonial. 
The Court held that the officers’ behavior did not amount to 
interrogation.51  It reasoned that there was obviously no direct 
questioning, and the police had no knowledge of the suggestibil-
ity of this suspect;52 therefore there was no interrogation. 
3. Were the Warnings Given and Was There a Waiver of 
Miranda Rights? 
Obviously, Miranda warnings must be given when there is 
custodial interrogation.  Moreover, it is equally clear that there 
must be a waiver of those rights for a suspect’s statements to be 
admissible against him in the prosecution’s case in chief. 
The waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent.  
However, in writing, this test appears far more difficult to meet 
than in practice.  The voluntary aspect does not focus on the “free 
will” of the suspect.  Rather, as set out in Connelly, it focuses 
merely on police overreaching.53  Thus, a person’s confession, af-
ter literally hearing voices commanding him to confess to a mur-
der, is deemed legally “voluntary,” provided the police did not 
manipulate his weakness.  Similarly, equivocation will likely be 
deemed to be a waiver.54 
 
 48 George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confessional Law: The 1986 and 1987 Su-
preme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 293–94 (1988); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police 
Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1173–74 (2001). 
 49 Innis, 446 U.S. at 295. 
 50 Id. at 294–95. 
 51 Id. at 302.  
  Turning to the facts of the present case, we conclude that the respondent 
was not ‘interrogated’ within the meaning of Miranda.  It is undisputed that 
the first prong of the definition of ‘interrogation’ was not satisfied, for the con-
versation between Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna included no express 
questioning of the respondent.  Rather, that conversation was, at least in form, 
nothing more than a dialogue between the two officers to which no response 
from the respondent was invited. 
Id. 
 52 Id.  This test should not be confused with the subjective Sixth Amendment test. 
 53 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986). 
 54 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
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It follows that the “knowing and intelligent” aspect is also 
relatively easy to meet.  In the context of the Miranda prophylac-
tic rule, a waiver is “knowing and intelligent” if the suspect is old 
enough to understand the warnings and is able to understand 
English.55 
The above analysis focuses on the initial waiver of Miranda 
rights.  However, if the suspect invokes some or all of the 
Miranda safeguards, the analysis becomes more complex. 
If the suspect invokes only the Miranda right to silence, e.g., 
by saying something like, “I don’t want to talk,” then the police 
are permitted to resume interrogation after a reasonable period 
of time.56  However, if the suspect invokes all of his or her 
Miranda rights by saying something like, “I want a lawyer,” then 
interrogation must completely cease for this crime and all crimes, 
period.57  The reason for this is that the request for a lawyer is 
tantamount to stating, “I am helpless.” 
In this latter situation, where the Miranda right to counsel 
is invoked, only if the suspect initiates further discussion and if 
the Miranda rights are fully waived will suspects’ statements be 
admissible at criminal trial.  The police are not permitted to re-
open interrogation after invocation of the Miranda right to coun-
sel.58 
4. Is there an Exception to Miranda? 
Like the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment, 
Miranda is a “prophylactic rule.”59 Via its inherent equitable 
powers, the U.S. Supreme Court created the rule to prevent the 
perceived harm of police overreaching and misconduct.  Thus, 
since the High Court has not deemed Miranda to be a mandate of 
the Constitution, it has allowed exceptions to the rule.  Although 
this approach is arguably unprincipled (since if it is not a neces-
sary part of the Constitution, the Supreme Court truly has less of 
a claim to jurisdiction), the approach does characterize the pre-
sent law.  Thus there have arisen many exceptions to Miranda. 
 
 55  G. Michael Deacon, Interrogation and Police Practices—Custodial Interroga-
tions—Waiver and Assertion of Miranda Rights, 81 GEO. L.J., 991, 1000–02 (1993). 
 56 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106–07 (1975). 
 57 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that once a defendant 
has asserted the Miranda right to counsel, officers may not question the defendant until a 
lawyer is made available to the defendant or until the “[defendant] himself initiates fur-
ther communication, exchanges, or conversations” with an officer). 
 58 Id. at 484–85.  
 59 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1975) (noting that the exclusionary rule is a 
prophylactic device to deter Fourth Amendment violations); United States v. Patane, 542 
U.S. 628, 636 (2004) (noting that Miranda is a prophylactic rule). 
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C. Derivative Evidence 
Together, Michigan v. Tucker60 and Oregon v. Elstad61 indi-
cate that unlike suppression in the Fourth Amendment context, 
derivative evidence of a Miranda violation is not to be suppressed 
absent police bad faith.62  Thus, voluntary admissions given dur-
ing custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings do not 
taint voluntary admissions after Miranda warnings have been 
given—even though such admissions merely repeat the un-
Mirandized statements—unless there was police bad faith.63  
Similarly, a live witness discovered as a result of admissions 
made in violation of Miranda can testify.64  Because there is no 
derivative evidence suppression requirement under Miranda, it 
follows that there is no need to explain the attenuation, inde-
pendent source and inevitable discovery doctrines. 
D. Form 
In California v. Prysock65 and Duckworth v. Eagan,66 the 
warnings were given in a slightly different manner.  In the latter 
case, for example, the suspect was told that no lawyer would be 
furnished unless and until the suspect were required to go to 
court—but if a lawyer was desired, questioning would cease.67  
This is, of course, quite out of sync with the latter two prongs of 
Miranda.  Nevertheless, it was held to be acceptable.68  In Colo-
rado v. Spring, the Court held that the warnings need not in-
 
 60 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (noting that the prophylactic Miranda warnings are “not 
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected”). 
 61 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 62 Id. at 306–08. 
 63 See id. at 309. 
 64 Id. at 308. 
 65 453 U.S. 355 (1981).  In Prysock, the defendant was a minor who confessed only 
after his parents met him at the police station and presumably pressured him to do so. 
 66 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989).  In Duckworth,  
  Respondent confessed to stabbing a woman nine times after she refused to 
have sexual relations with him, and he was convicted of attempted murder.  
Before confessing, respondent was given warnings by the police, which in-
cluded the advice that a lawyer would be appointed ‘if and when you go to 
court.’ The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
such advice did not comply with the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona.  
Id. at 197 (citation omitted).  However, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the “if 
and when you go to court” language did not suggest that “only those accused who can af-
ford an attorney have the right to have one present before answering any questions,” and 
it did not “impl[y] that if the accused does not ‘go to court,’ [i.e.,] the government does not 
file charges, the accused is not entitled to [counsel] at all.”  Id. at 203 (quoting Eagan v. 
Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1988)).  Thus the Miranda warnings with this 
additional language were held to be sufficient. 
 67 Id. at 198. 
 68 Id. at 203. 
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clude information as to what crime is being investigated.69 
E. Vicarious Assertion 
Moran v. Burbine indicated that Miranda rights are the per-
sonal rights of the suspect, and cannot be vicariously asserted by 
the suspect’s attorney.70  In this case, the suspect’s sister, without 
the suspect’s knowledge, retained counsel for the suspect.  The 
attorney phoned the police station and the police lied to her, say-
ing that they would not interrogate her client.  The Court held 
that this questionable police behavior did not require dismissal.71 
F. Probation 
It could be argued that probation is custodial, and that there 
is interrogation when a probation interview is mandatory.  How-
ever, the Court has held that Miranda warnings are not required 
for probation interviews.72  Although the Court reasoned that 
such interviews are not custodial, this can be logically catego-
rized as another exception to Miranda. 
G. Emergency/Public Safety 
Miranda warnings need not be given when police ask ques-
tions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety; 
suppression is only mandated if the statements were actually co-
erced.73  The test is objective.  If there is an imminent exigency, 
Miranda may be dispensed with.  As is usually the case, the offi-
 
 69 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (holding that “a suspect’s awareness 
of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to de-
termining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth 
Amendment privilege”). 
 70 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986) (stating that there is an “elemen-
tal and established proposition that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is, 
by hypothesis, a personal one that can only be invoked by the individual whose testimony 
is being compelled”). 
 71 Id. at 432–34 (“We do not question that on facts more egregious than those pre-
sented here police deception might rise to a level of a due process violation . . . [However, 
w]e hold only that, on these facts, the challenged conduct falls short of the kind of misbe-
havior that so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion 
into the criminal processes of the States.”). 
 72 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984). 
 73 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984). 
  [T]here is a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement that Miranda 
warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence, 
and the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of 
the individual officers involved.  In a kaleidoscopic situation . . . where sponta-
neity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of the 
day, the application of the [public safety exception] should not be made to de-
pend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective 
motivation of the arresting officer.  
Id. 
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cers’ actual intent is irrelevant.74 
H. Impeachment 
Voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda can be 
used to impeach a defendant who takes the stand.75  Interest-
ingly, the original Miranda opinion, in dictum, indicated that the 
defendant’s statements could not be used against him at all.76  At 
any rate, this exception does not extend to impeaching defense 
witnesses with the defendant’s statements.77   
I. Terry Stops 
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court held that a stop is a seizure of the 
person, and thus technically is custodial.78  Nevertheless, as indi-
cated in Berkemer v. McCarty, Miranda warnings need not be 
given when there is a stop, and voluntary responses should not 
be suppressed.79  The difficult issue here is in distinguishing a 
stop from an informal (de facto) arrest.  In the latter situation, 
Miranda warnings are required. 
J. Interrogation by a Private Party 
Similar to Fourth Amendment rights, Miranda warnings are 
required in custodial interrogation only if a police officer or other 
government agent is performing the interrogation.80  They are 
not mandated for custodial interrogation conducted by private 
parties. 
 
 74 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 363 (2001). 
 75 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975). 
 76 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). 
If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be 
used by the prosecution.  In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory 
by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demon-
strate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove 
guilt by implication.  These statements are incriminating in any meaningful 
sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective 
waiver required for any other statement. 
Id. 
 77 James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 308–09 (1990). 
 78 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (“[W]hen the officer, by means of physical 
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we con-
clude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”). 
 79 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). 
 80 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461 (“We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the 
privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-
custody questioning.  An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, 
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion de-
scribed above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak.”). 
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K. Police Trickery 
Although the Miranda Court was offended by police trickery 
(e.g., reverse line-up, false accusation or “Mutt & Jeff” (good cop-
bad cop) techniques), later Supreme Courts have usually ignored 
such conduct.  In Michigan v. Mosley, for example, the Supreme 
Court held that a false accusation by the police was irrelevant.81  
A similar situation occurred in Frazier v. Cupp.82  Further, al-
though the Supreme Court disagreed, Innis likely also indicates 
the presence of police trickery.83  Again, it seems that police 
trickery is acceptable so long as it is not highly egregious.84  This 
analysis may also explain Moran v. Burbine, where the police 
trickery was aimed at the suspect’s attorney.85 
L. Routine Booking 
A suspect’s incriminating statements during routine booking 
can be used against him, even if the suspect has invoked his 
Miranda rights beforehand.  Thus, for example, a slurred re-
sponse after a request for the suspect’s address is admissible to 
show that the suspect was intoxicated.86 
M. Plainclothes Interrogation 
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has held that a suspect in 
jail who has invoked his Miranda rights can be interrogated by a 
police officer or agent, provided that this person appears not to be 
a police agent.  The Court reasoned that the purpose behind 
Miranda was the desire to reduce the intimidation of “official in-
terrogation.”87 
N. What is “Interrogation?” 
The test for whether there was interrogation is not the same 
 
 81 423 U.S. 96, 104–05, 107 (1975). 
 82 394 U.S. 731, 735 (1969) (holding that the prosecutor’s inclusion of a summary of 
testimony in his opening statement, which he expected to receive from a person who had 
been indicted with the accused and had pleaded guilty, but who later asserted his privi-
lege against self-incrimination when called as a witness by the prosecutor, did not deprive 
the defendant of his right of confrontation because the court instructed the jury that those 
statements were not to be regarded as evidence, and that was sufficient to protect the de-
fendant’s constitutional rights). 
 83 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 294–95 (1980). 
 84 The double questioning, once before giving the Miranda warnings and once imme-
diately after, was found to violate Miranda because it was so egregious.  See Missouri v. 
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2613 (2004). 
 85 475 U.S. 412, 417 (1986) (holding that the police did not act so egregiously as to 
deprive the defendant of due process when the officers lied to suspect’s counsel, saying 
that the suspect would not be questioned when he, in fact, was). 
 86 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590 (1990). 
 87 See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990). 
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under the Sixth Amendment as it is under the Fifth Amendment.  
The Sixth Amendment test queries whether the police “deliber-
ately elicited” an incriminating response.88  That is, the focus is 
on police bad faith.  Weakness of the suspect is not required.  
This is an easier test for the defendant.  Under this test, not only 
is direct questioning precluded (absent a defendant-initiated 
waiver), but police trickery is also precluded.89  Once the accused 
invokes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, there can be no 
waiver of the right unless the defendant initiates further discus-
sion with the police or prosecution. 
However, the Sixth Amendment interrogation protection, 
unlike Miranda rights, is only applicable to the crime for which 
the defendant is formally charged.90  Thus, if the defendant is 
questioned on unrelated crimes, the only protections are the Fifth 
Amendment voluntariness test and Miranda—even if he or she 
has already been indicted for the other crimes.91 
Yet despite all of the above convoluted rules, rationales and 
exceptions, the High Court held in Dickerson that Miranda, now 
long a part of our law, though not mandated by the Constitution, 
is constitutional law!92 
CONCLUSION 
What lessons can be learned from the above analysis?  Go 
slowly.  Judges should not create law unless there has been am-
ple time to debate the underlying principles of the Constitution.  
And, if the High Court erred, as it certainly did in Miranda, it 
 
 88 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 89 See generally Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (holding that a defendant’s 
right to counsel is violated if the defendant has invoked his right to counsel and police of-
ficers use deceptive means to entice the defendant to talk).  
 90 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986). 
 91 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (reaffirming the bright-line rule estab-
lished in Edwards: a suspect who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has 
been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication” 
(quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981))).  However, in Roberson, three 
days elapsed between the unsatisfied request for counsel and the separate-offense inter-
rogation.  Id. at 686.  Under such circumstances, the Court found there to be a serious 
risk that the mere repetition of the warnings would not overcome the presumption of co-
ercion created by prolonged police custody.  Id.  Furthermore, the fact that it may be in an 
uncounseled suspect’s interest to know about, and to give a statement concerning, the 
separate offense does not compel an exception to Edwards, since the suspect, having re-
quested counsel, can determine how to deal with the separate investigations with coun-
sel’s advice, and since the police are free to inform the suspect of the facts of the second 
investigation, as long as they do not interrogate him, and he is free to initiate further 
communication.  Id. at 687.  See also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) (not-
ing that the Edwards rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into 
waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights”). 
 92 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
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should bite the bullet, overrule the case, and create law that is 
principled and that makes a modicum of sense.  To wit, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel should attach at jailing, and giving 
Miranda warnings should set up a rebuttable presumption of 
voluntariness, and no more. 
 
